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Abstract
When extended cognition is extended into mainstream epistemol-
ogy, an awkward tension arises when considering cases of environmen-
tal epistemic luck. Surprisingly, it is not at all clear how the main-
stream verdict that agents lack knowledge in cases of environmental
luck can be reconciled with principles central to extended cognition.
1 Introduction
Proponents of extended cognition lament what Clark (2011) calls biopreju-
dice. If, for some process C, one would count C as a cognitive process were it
to have occurred within the skull and skin, but exclude it as such because it
doesn’t, the kind of alleged bioprejudice here would be metaphysical–a prej-
udice that affects one’s position on the metaphysical nature of a cognitive
process. Clark & Chalmers (1998), in their seminal paper, think we can avoid
the mistake of metaphysical bioprejudice by adhering to what they call the
parity principle:
Parity Principle: If, as we confront some task, a part of the world
functions as a process which, were it to go on in the head, we would have
no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive process, then that
part of the world is part of the cognitive process. (Clark & Chalmers
1998: 8)
Those who accept the parity principle will count as cognitive processes
the extracranial analogues of whatever intracranial cognitive processes they
already recognize. For some intracranial cognitive process C, C* is C ’s
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extracranial1 analogue just in case, by reference to the parity principle, C*
is a cognitive process if C is a cognitive process. In Clark & Chalmers’s
classic case of Otto, the process of consulting a notebook is presented as the
extracranial analogue of consulting one’s biological memory.
Otto: Otto suffers from Alzheimer’s disease, and like many
Alzheimer’s patients, he relies on information in the environment
to help structure his life. Otto carries a notebook around with
him everywhere he goes. When he learns new information, he
writes it down. When he needs some old information, he looks
it up. For Otto, his notebook plays the role usually played by a
biological memory.
The parity principle forbids metaphysical bioprejudice while permitting what
I’ll call epistemic bioprejudice. Consider that I could, by reference to the
parity principle, recognize Otto’s process as a bona fide cognitive process,
whilst nonetheless maintaining the following: that Otto fails to count as
knowing2 some proposition p, even though Otto’s intracranial counterpart,
who differs from Otto only in that he relies on a biological memory, counts
as knowing p3.
To the extent that proponents of extended cognition appeal to egalitarian
considerations, they should be dissatisfied by the prospect that the extracra-
nial nature of Otto’s cognitive process could ever exclude him from knowing
what his counterpart, different only in relying on the intracranial analogue
of the process Otto uses, counts as knowing. More than the parity principle
is needed, then, to combat bioprejudice in epistemology.
1I am using this term to refer to processes claimed to extend, at least in part, outside
the skin and skull. I am not making a distinction here between extracranial and what
some writers have called transcranial processes. See here, for example, Adams & Aizawa
(2008).
2For simplicity’s sake, I am framing epistemic bioprejudice in terms of knowledge:
one betrays her epistemic bioprejudice when withholding knowledge in a case where the
process employed is in part extracranial and, were the process employed the intracranial
analogue of the process actually employed, knowledge would have been ascribed. There
are of course other ways to betray epistemic bioprejudice, insofar as cases of extended
cognition stand subject to our ascriptions of (for example) justification, understanding,
rationality or intellectual virtue.
3Such a verdict would betray epistemic, rather than metaphysical, bioprejudice because
the stance welcomes extracranial processes as cognitive processes; the bioprejudice is epis-
temic because it takes the distinction to be an epistemic difference maker, even if not a
difference maker from the perspective of assessing what qualifies as a cognitive process.
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2 Epistemic Parity
The parity principle then guards against only metaphysical bioprejudice.
That’s not good enough. Proponents of cognitive extension require an ad-
ditional principle, an epistemic parity principle, to guard against epistemic
bioprejudice. Call this the E-parity principle.
E-Parity Principle: For agent S and belief p, if S comes to believe
p by a process which, were it to go on in the head, we would have no
hesitation in ascribing knowledge of p to S, then S knows p.
Just as the original parity principle implies that we must accept as cog-
nitive processes the extracranial analogues of whatever intracranial cognitive
processes we already recognize, the E-parity principle implies something to
the effect that: we must accept as cases of knowledge the extracranial epis-
temic analogue cases of whatever intracranial cases of cognition we count as
knowledge. For two otherwise epistemically symmetrical4 cases of cognition,
A and A*, A* is an extracranial epistemic analogue (hereafter, extracranial
analogue) of A just in case, A and A* differ in that the process employed in
A* is, by reference to the (original) parity principle, the extracranial ana-
logue of the cognitive process employed in A. More generally, the E-parity
principle implies that substituting the extracranial analogue of an intracra-
nial cognitive process, while keeping everything else epistemically symmetri-
cal across cases, should never be difference-making from the perspective of
epistemic evaluation.5 Even shorter: the difference between intracranial and
extracranial analogues is not an epistemic difference.
The E-parity principle captures I think a key implication of extended cog-
nition for epistemological theorising6: it constitutes, no less than the parity
4If two cases are epistemically symmetrical, then (for instance) a theory of epistemic
justification or knowledge must treat them the same.
5For two cases, A and A*, where A* is the extracranial analogue case of A, non-
epistemically relevant features of A* can differ from A so long as the epistemically relevant
features of the case–viz., the features that matter for assessing whether the case is a case
of knowledge–remain symmetrical. Because E-parity is a principle aimed at preventing
prejudice about what counts as knowledge, it is appropriate to frame E-parity in terms of
analogue cases that require just that the relevant epistemic features are held fixed (rather
than in terms of the more narrow category of intercranial-extracranial counterpart cases,
according to which even the non-epistemically relevant features across cases are held fixed.)
6See here especially Hetherington’s (2012) gradualist proposal, according to which, with
reference to extended cognition, knowledge might be attributed to different extents.
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principle, a kind of ex ante constraint on any epistemological thesis amenable
to cognitive extension. Any epistemological thesis violates the E-parity prin-
ciple if it has as a consequence that (for instance) Otto’s intracranial ana-
logue, but not Otto, counts as a knower, just as any epistemological thesis
violates the parity principle if it counts Otto’s intracranial analogue but not
Otto as employing a cognitive process. Commitments in epistemology can
stand in tension with either the parity principle or the E-parity principle,
and the egalitarian aims of cognitive extension should permit the violation
of neither.
3 Parity and epistemic luck
Epistemologists overwhelmingly accept that the following is not a case of
knowledge7:
Barn facade: Driving through the countryside, Jimmy wants to teach
his son the word barn. He points to what (unbeknownst to him) is the
lone real barn in the area. He could have just as easily pointed to one
the facades (indistinguishable from the real barn) and formed a false
belief.
The (very) short explanation for why Jimmy lacks knowledge is that his
getting it right is down to luck. Holding fixed the way Jimmy forms the
belief in the actual world–by pointing to one of the barn-looking objects in
the facade-littered countryside–he believes falsely in nearby possible worlds.
Compare the barn facade case now with the following case in which we reprise
Otto from the original Clark & Chalmers (1998) example:
Case 1: Otto consults his notebook to determine when his doctor’s
appointment was today, and finds the correct time, noon, written in
the book. Unbeknownst to Otto, his notebook had been stolen by a
jokester, who fudged with the times of Otto’s other appointments that
day, changing them all back an hour. The jokester, however, overlooked
the doctor’s appointment, leaving the original and correct time intact.
7For a sample of some explicit statements on this point, see for example Swain (1978),
Lewis (1996), Kvanvig (2003, 2004), Pritchard (2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2009), Steup
(2008), Luper (2010), Madison (2011), Kelp (2012a), Jarvis (2012), Carter (2010, 2011)
and Carter, Jarvis & Rubin (2012a, 2012b). This list is far from exhaustive. There is
some dissent, however–especially from experimental philosophy–which I consider in §4.
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A natural response to Case 1 is to view it as structurally akin to the barn
facade case. We should deny knowledge to Otto for the very same reasons we
deny knowledge to Jimmy8. As epistemologists typically put it, both cases
are ones where knowledge is undermined by environmental epistemic luck.
On this more will be said. But first, some more general observations: that
Otto fails to count as knowing in Case 1 is not itself problematic. But this
verdict–perfectly intuitive in mainstream epistemology–has two very awk-
ward implications for proponents of extended cognition. The first awkward
implication is that it stands in tension with the parity principle. The second
awkward implication is that it stands in tension with the E-parity principle.
Let’s look at these in turn.
3.1 Tension with (metaphysical) parity
That the no-knowledge verdict given to Case 1 stands at tension with meta-
physical parity (hereafter, M-parity) is not obvious. But after a few back-
ground remarks about epistemic luck, it will be.
Consider first that a task of anti-luck epistemologists is to specify the pre-
cise sense in which knowledge cannot depend on luck9, and to generate (with
reference to this specification), a plausible anti-luck condition on knowledge.
The anti-luck condition needs to not be so strong that it gives false posi-
tives. After all, sometimes, knowledge can depend on luck in a way that is
epistemically benign. Consider the following.
1. My knowledge that the Swedes, despite being outnumbered 10-to-1,
defeated the Russians in the battle of Narva in 1700.
2. Detective Fusco’s knowledge that Johnny was planning a murder–knowledge
Fusco acquires by luckily finding Johnny’s confession note.
8Consider that, while one who endorses extended cognition will, by reference to the
parity principle, count the notebook employed in the actual world as part of the cognitive
process, the same is not true for the barn facades. Note that a condition for satisfying the
parity principle (which circumscribes which processes are counted as cognitive processes,
by proponents of extended cognition), involves Clark & Chalmers’s (1998) notion of cou-
pling. While Otto counts as coupled to his notebook, Jimmy does not qualify as coupled
to the genuine barn. See also §5 for additional discussion here. Thanks to an anonymous
reviewer for raising this issue.
9As Pritchard (2007) puts it: “...we evaluate theories of knowledge in terms of whether
they are able to accommodate this claim. If they can’t–that is, if they allow lucky
knowledge–then this is taken to be a decisive ground for rejecting the view.”
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The first case is a case of content epistemic luck. What is lucky here is just
that the proposition is true. The Swedes could have easily lost that battle
(and almost surely would have, had there not been a blinding snowstorm).10
Knowledge is perfectly compatible with content epistemic luck; we know of
many improbable events, that they occurred. The luck present in (2) is
different, though equally unproblematic from the perspective of ascribing
knowledge. In (2), what is lucky is that Fusco ever acquired the evidence
that he does in favour of his belief. Call this kind of luck evidential epistemic
luck. The fact that one’s being correct depends on evidential epistemic luck
is not something our ascriptions of knowledge are, or should be, sensitive to.
So what kind of luck can knowledge not depend on? The dominant answer
in the literature is Pritchard’s (2005): knowledge is incompatible with what
is called veritic epistemic luck11:
Veritic Epistemic Luck: For all agents S and propositions p, the
truth of S ’s belief that p is veritically lucky if and only if S ’s belief that
p is true in the actual world a but false in nearly all nearby possible
worlds in which S forms the belief in the same manner as in a.
Veritic luck comes in two notable varieties: intervening veritic luck and
environmental veritic luck. The former variety is characteristic of standard
Gettier-style cases, where luck intervenes between the agent the belief she
forms12. In cases of environmental veritic luck, that you could easily have
been wrong is down to a bad epistemic environment13 rather than to any
luck that interferes with the agent’s formation of a true belief14.
10I borrow this example from Peterson (2009: 4)
11For a recent challenge to this position, see Hetherington (2011, Ch. 3); here Het-
herington defends what he calls combinatorial luck as better-suited than veritic luck at
capturing the luck that is incompatible with knowing. Hetherington (forthcoming) also
challenges Pritchard on this point; compare here with Pritchard’s (forthcoming) reply, in
the same volume.
12Consider, for example, Gettier’s (1963) original case involving Smith, who believes,
(with justification), that the man who gets the job has 10 coins in his pocket. Smith’s
belief is true, but true because a different man (himself) happened to get the job, and
Smith also happened to have 10 coins in his pocket. Cf. §4.2, Case 5.
13Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that, often, bad epistemic environ-
ments are presented as ones that are also unfamiliar to the agent. It should be stressed
that unfamiliarity is (though common) not an essential feature of a bad epistemic en-
vironment. See here Zagzebski’s (1996: 285-286) environmental-luck style challenge to
Plantinga (1993).
14See Pritchard (2007) for further discussion on this point.
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The claim that knowledge can’t depend on veritic luck (of either variety)
is tantamount to saying that: if you know, then you couldn’t easily have
been wrong (given the way you came to form the target belief). For the
present purposes, what’s important to note is that an assessment of whether
the correctness of a given belief depends on veritic epistemic luck (hereafter,
epistemic luck) requires a kind of framing problem: we have to decide what
to hold fixed under the description of the relevant manner that led to the for-
mation of the target belief in the actual world, when we move out to nearby
worlds. The framing problem is a species of the generality problem15: there
are costs associated with construing what to hold fixed too narrowly, as well
as too widely. Accordingly, it’s hard to specify precisely all that needs to
be held fixed16. But we will always at least hold fixed everything under the
description of the cognitive process the agent employs in the actual world, as
well as such things as the agent’s physical and mental condition (Pritchard
2007). And what to hold fixed under the description of the cognitive process
deployed will be partially, though not wholly, determined by one’s metaphys-
ical commitments as to the nature of cognitive processes17.
We’re now in a position to see how the no-knowledge verdict in Case 1
threatens M-parity. Otto’s belief is epistemically lucky because, given how
he forms the belief–by consulting a notebook tampered with by a jokester–
he could have easily been incorrect–e.g. in many close possible worlds, the
jokester doesn’t overlook the doctor’s appointment entry, and Otto is an
hour early to the appointment. The key point here is that, by reference to
M-parity, the notebook itself –a notebook with a correct time written in it–is
held fixed under the description of the relevant cognitive process. But if it
is, then the safety of Otto’s belief is no longer undermined by environmental
epistemic luck in Case 118. After all, in most nearby worlds where Otto
15Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
16Cf. Kvanvig (2008), in his critique of Pritchard (2005), for some observations on the
difficulty of getting the framing problem right.
17Accordingly, proponents of extended cognition who are metaphysically committed to
allowing more of the world to feature in a description of a cognitive process will hold more
fixed under the description of the cognitive process employed in the actual world, than
those without such commitments.
18The same results follows if we think of safety as a property of methods fundamentally,
and beliefs derivatively. The extended memorial method employed by Otto in the actual
world is a method of consulting his notebook, as it is in the actual world. This method is
safe in nearby worlds, as the notebook contains the correct entry. Thanks to Chris Kelp
for discussion on this point.
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consults a notebook with a correct time for the doctor appointment, he forms
a true belief–and so his correctness isn’t lucky19. (Compare: if we held fixed
the barn Jimmy actually points to in the barn facade case, we’d get the
result that he knows–the wrong result). The upshot here is that the verdict
that Otto lacks knowledge in Case 1 seems to fly squarely in the face of M-
parity. M-parity implies that Otto’s process–the extracranial analogue of a
cognitive process (memory) we recognize–is a cognitive process. But we most
saliently explain why Otto’s belief is unsafe (and therefore, not knowledge20)
by excluding the notebook (which has the correct time) from what we hold
fixed under the description of the cognitive process Otto employs in forming
a belief about the time of his doctor’s appointment. And such an exclusion
is in violation of M-Parity.
3.2 Tension with E-parity
Let’s revisit Case 1, which by the lights of mainstream epistemology is not a
case of knowledge, but rather, a case in which knowledge is undermined by
environmental epistemic luck. By reference to the E-parity principle, knowl-
edge should also fail to be present in any case that is an intracranial analogue
case of Case 1. To get an intracranial analogue case for Case 1, we first sub-
stitute biological memory for the notebook. Next, we keep the epistemically
relevant features fixed across cases; this involves–in the case of a biological
memory–obscuring the other appointment times recorded in Otto’s memory,
though permitting him to remember his doctor’s appointment time21. Con-
sider now, Case 2, which meets these conditions for an intracranial analogue
19Indeed, if we hold fixed that Otto consults a notebook with the correct time of his
doctor’s appointment, the nearest worlds where he gets the time wrong are far-off worlds–
worlds where (for instance) something unusual (say, bizarre ambient light) prevents him
from apprehending the time of his appointment when he consults a notebook in which it
is clearly written.
20Although I think that safe, true beliefs also happen to often satisfy the conditions for
knowledge, I am not committing to safety as a sufficient condition for knowledge. Thanks
to a reviewer for pointing out that, in any of the cases discussed here, there are features
other than safety which could potentially be referenced in accounting for why an agent
doesn’t know. What’s relevant to my discussion on this point is just that, given M-Parity,
the salient explanation for why Otto fails to know–namely, that is belief is unsafe–is off
the table.
21Thanks to Benjamin Jarvis, Chris Kelp and Wybo Houkes for helpful correspondence
on this point. We can think of the role of the jokester in this analogue as one’s neurological
makeup, the latter of which determines that some, but not other, memories are obscured.
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case to Case 1:
Case 2: Otto* (without Alzheimers) has a normally functioning bio-
logical memory, which he relies on to organise his world. Atypically for
Otto*, he forgets the time of his other appointments today–believing
they were earlier than they actually are–though he does remember that
his doctor’s appointment is at noon.
Since Case 1 is an extracranial analogue of Case 2, E-parity tells us that
the Case 1 is a case of knowledge if Case 2 is22. Now here’s the twist: Main-
stream thinking about epistemic luck tells us Case 2 is a case of knowledge23.
Given the way Otto* forms his belief–viz., by consulting a clear memory of
the time of the appointment–he couldn’t easily have been wrong. Does it
matter that, even though he didn’t, he could have forgotten his doctor’s
appointment time, as he’d forgotten the times of his other appointments?
Consider Case 3:
Case 3: Phineas is working on the railroad and slips, coming within
an inch of impaling his frontal lobe with an iron rod. Had the iron
rod impaled his frontal lobe, he would have confused the time of his
22Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that one might object to the
analogy by arguing as follows: that there is a factual defeater present in Case 1 (namely,
that the jokester tampered with the other dates in the notebook) but not in Case 2.
However, on closer inspection, the same kind of factual defeater either is or is not present
in both cases. Consider that in Case 2, one could have forgotten the target proposition
(by the same mechanisms that led to Otto* forgetting the other appointments). Deny
that this fact is a factual defeater, and it’s hard to see how to motivate the line that there
is a factual defeater in Case 1 consisting in the fact that the date could have easily been
changed by the jokester, even though it wasn’t. I should add that, as an aside, I don’t
want to take a stance on the epistemic status of factual defeaters, or the conditions for
factual defeat. The point is only that the cases are more similar with respect to apparent
factual defeat than it might seem on first blush.
23Hetherington (1998; forthcoming) has suggested that cases like Case 2 count against
the anti-luck platitude, as they constitute a kind of lucky knowledge. He goes even fur-
ther to conclude that knowledge is present in Gettier cases. For a recent criticism of
Hetherington on these points, see Madison (2011). It is worth pointing out that anti-luck
epistemologists can agree with Hetherington that Case 2 is a case of lucky knowledge while
denying that the case is lucky in a way that is, by reference to veritic luck, incompatible
with knowledge. Put differently, the sense in which we recognise Case 2 as “lucky knowl-
edge” doesn’t show knowledge to be compatible with veritic luck anymore than recognising
“fool’s gold” commits one to the view that there is a kind of gold coextensive with iron
pyrite.
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doctor’s appointment (by thinking it was an hour earlier). Fortunately
for Phineas, the iron rod merely affected the part of his brain respon-
sible for mood (making him a bit angrier), and after he stands up, he
remembers correctly the time of his doctor’s appointment.
In Case 3, the natural verdict is that Phineas knows the time of his
doctor’s appointment. And that’s indeed the right result. Although Phineas
surely could have damaged his memory, he didn’t, and as he didn’t it’s not
lucky that he’s correct. Likewise, in Case 2, Otto* (like anyone else) could
have forgotten the time of his appointment, though he didn’t, and because
he clearly remembers it, it’s not lucky that (in retrieving what he clearly
remembers) he’s correct24.
But if Case 1 is not a case of knowledge and Case 2 is, then we have a
conflict with E-parity. E-parity tells us that Case 1 is a case of knowledge if
Case 2 is. So it looks like we have to either count Case 1 as a case of knowl-
edge (and fly in the face of anti-luck epistemology) or give up on E-parity
(and fly in the face of extended cognition). Framed this way, our ordinary
thinking about epistemic luck commits bioprejudice, or, proponents of ex-
tended cognition should restrict their egalitarian ambitions to metaphysical
parity, giving up on epistemic parity.
4 Responses
As things stand, it looks like mainstream thinking about epistemic luck can-
not easily make room for extended cognition, any more than extended cogni-
tion can make sense of mainstream thinking about epistemic luck25. So far,
I’ve argued that the mainstream verdict in Case 1 flies in the face of both
the original parity principle as well as the E-parity principle (a principle I
argued in §2 is needed to guard against bioprejudice in epistemology). But
perhaps I’ve been too quick. Let’s investigate now how we might escape this
unhappy conclusion.
24After all, the nearest worlds in which he gets it wrong despite retrieving a correct
memory on the point are worlds where there is some anomalous, neural breakdown that
occurs after the retrieval of the correct memory, blocking the formation of a correct belief.
25Compare this assessment with Plantinga’s (1993) point that Gettier cases depend
on JTB’s allowing its justification condition to be satisfiable entirely by an internalistic
justification condition. Thanks to an anonymous referee for drawing attention to this
comparison.
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All the tension evaporates, of course, if Otto simply counts as knowing in
Case 126. The similarity between Case 1 and a barn facade case is difficult
to deny. So trying to save Case 1 as a case of knowledge by granting that
barn facade cases are not cases of knowledge, and then arguing Case 1 to
be structurally dissimilar to a barn facade case, is unpromising27. Another
strategy would be to grant the structural similarity between Case 1 and barn
facade cases while parting with orthodoxy and claiming these cases actually
are cases of knowledge. Such a strategy has some precedent, though not
much.
This line of thought is developed, in a qualified way, by Sosa (2007), who
distinguishes between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge28. Sosa
thinks reflective knowledge is not compatible with the kind of environmental
luck at play in barn facade cases, though he is willing to grant (lower-grade)
animal knowledge in such cases. One could motivate an ascription of knowl-
edge in Case 1, then, by arguing that animal knowledge is present, even if
reflective knowledge is not. One problem with this route, though, is that
extended cognition would be (in a qualified way) reconcilable with main-
stream thinking about epistemic luck only by one who already grants Sosa’s
unorthodox distinction between animal and reflective knowledge. While this
allows for a reconciliation, it does so in a way that is problematically restric-
tive, pushing the problem down the line to the majority of epistemologists
who do not subscribe to a dual account of animal and reflective knowledge.
Another kind of strategy would be to appeal to experimental philosophy,
or X-phi, in an attempt to challenge the broad consensus in epistemology
regarding cases of environmental luck. In a recent paper on epistemic in-
tuitions and barn facade thought experiments, Colao, Buckwalter & Stich
(2012) found that, while individuals surveyed did distinguish between barn
26Why not simply say that Jimmy has a veridical perceptual experience in the barn
facade case, and leave it at that? This is the broadly McDowellian (1994) line. And
since Jimmy satisfies McDowell’s further condition of not believing irresponsibly, Jimmy
knows, on McDowell’s view. I concede this point, though I note that the cost of the
McDowellian line is an (apparent) inability to handle cases where environmental epistemic
luck is widely thought to undermine knowledge. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for
noting the availability of this line of reply.
27Cf. Kelp (2012b) for a related discussion on this point.
28On Sosa’s view, animal knowledge is apt belief–belief that is accurate because adroit.
Reflective knowledge is meta-apt belief, which is apt belief, aptly noted. Unlike animal
knowledge, reflective knowledge requires that the agent exhibit a kind of meta-competence,
whereby she recognises (or takes for granted) that her first-order belief as aptly formed.
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facade and control cases (where the agent is in a good environment), the
difference is not as significant as would be suggested by the overwhelming
consensus in epistemology. They also found that age matters; older individu-
als surveyed were less likely to attribute knowledge than were younger people
surveyed. Unfortunately, it’s not clear what surveys like this are supposed
to mean for epistemologists. This is a large issue, and not one I will attempt
to address here. It should suffice to point out that the kind of resolution we
should want between mainstream anti-luck epistemology and extended cog-
nition should not be a resolution that can be purchased only by those willing
to explain how X-phi data is supposed to overturn mainstream philosophical
consensus29.
If we’re going to resolve the tension between the mainstream verdict on
Case 1 and the M-Parity and E-Parity principles, it won’t be as easy as
rejecting the mainstream verdict on Case 1. Something else has to give. What
has to give doesn’t necessarily have to be E-Parity or M-Parity. Perhaps the
problem lies with some of the other claims we relied on to generate the tension
between the Case 1 and M-Parity and E-Parity, respectively.
4.1 The tension with M-Parity (revisited)
The tension between M-Parity and a recognition of Case 1 as a case of knowl-
edge was, in short, that M-Parity demands we include Otto’s notebook as
part of his cognitive process. But since the notebook had the correct time
for his doctor’s appointment in it, most nearby worlds in which he consults
that notebook are ones where he gets it right. Since that notebook is, by
reference to M-Parity, part of his cognitive process, it comes with him when
we move out from the actual world. But because it does, it seems that an
implication of M-Parity is that Otto’s belief is safe, as he believes truly in
most nearby worlds. But of course, this result conflicts with the verdict that
his belief is undermined by environmental epistemic luck.
We aren’t jettisoning the verdict that Otto lacks knowledge, and neither
should we be comfortable with so quickly dismissing the independently plau-
sible M-Parity. So let’s look at the details more closely to determine what
else is on the table. As we considered in §3.1, we can make sense of Otto’s
belief (in Case 1) as undermined by environmental luck if we narrow the
29See Knobe & Nichols (2008) for a sample of papers supporting and criticising the
experimental approach.
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cognitive process to exclude the notebook. But this simply conflicts with
M-Parity. What if, instead, we beefed up the cognitive process, to include
not only the notebook but also the jokester? Such a proposal has an initial
promise for resolving the conflict: we might think that, whilst holding fixed
the notebook (with the correct appointment time) was responsible for the
result that Otto’s belief would be safe, we could counteract this result by
including the tampering jokester under the description of the cognitive pro-
cess. It might be argued, then, that since the jokester is tampering with the
notebook in nearby worlds, Otto’s belief is not knowledge (consistent with
the mainstream verdict in epistemology), and since we aren’t excluding the
notebook from the cognitive process, we aren’t at odds with M-Parity.
Unfortunately, this line runs into some disastrous problems. Firstly, if we
take seriously the idea of holding fixed the jokester (as well as the notebook)
as part of the cognitive process, then we are holding fixed both the jokester
and notebook from the actual world. This means holding fixed a notebook
with the correct time for the doctor’s appointment and a jokester who over-
looked that. But in most nearby worlds in which Otto forms his belief by
consulting a notebook with a correct time (which a tag-a-long jokester over-
looks when changing the others), Otto believes truly, and thus, the belief is
not undermined by environmental epistemic luck. This problem is devastat-
ing. But even if it could be avoided, there is the separate problem, which is
that it’s not clear that, even on the most liberal interpretation of M-Parity,
the jokester counts as part of the relevant cognitive process. Recall that the
notebook counts as part of the cognitive process by M-Parity because con-
sulting the notebook is an extracranial analogue of biological memory. It’s
not clear where the jokester fits in30. Any plausible version of M-Parity must
guard against extending cognition too far, so that the lines between cognitive
and non-cognitive processes are erased31.
4.2 The tension with E-Parity (revisited)
Perhaps the tension between the no-knowledge verdict in Case 1 and M-
Parity can be reconciled. Even if it could be, the problem of reconciling the
30As Clark & Chalmers (1998: 8) note, cases of extended cognition occur when the
human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction that creates a
coupled system. While it’s apparent how coupling takes place with the notebook, it’s not
clear how it could be argued to apply mutatis mutandis to the jokester.
31See here Spaulding (2012) for a recent presentation of this worry.
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no-knowledge verdict in Case 1 with E-Parity remains. How might we get
around the tension here, without giving up the no-knowledge verdict in Case
1 or E-parity? The tension, recall, arises in part because it was argued that
Case 2 was an intracranial analogue case of Case 1, and that knowledge was
present in Case 2. We’ve already considered in §3.2 why Case 2 is a case of
knowledge. Perhaps the place to press, then, is the matter of whether Case 2
really is such that E-parity requires us to count Case 1 as a case of knowledge
if we count Case 2 as a case of knowledge. Put another way, perhaps Case 2
isn’t really an intracranial analogue of Case 1. Let’s pursue this line.
Consulting a biological memory is indeed the intracranial analogue of
consulting the notebook, in Case 1. Though, Case 2 is only the intracranial
analogue of Case 1 if we keep the other epistemically relevant features of
the case fixed. It was argued in §3.2 that when we did, it turned out the
difference between the intracranial and extracranial processes was an epis-
temic difference, in that we ended up with knowledge in one case, but not the
other. And this is just the kind of epistemic bioprejudice that is supposed
to be ruled out by E-parity.
Now, one might attempt to argue, for luck-based reasons, that Case 4
(a case where, by the lights of mainstream epistemology, knowledge isn’t
present) is more plausibly an intracranial analogue to Case 1 than Case 2
was:
Case 4: Otto** tries to remember when his doctor’s appointment is
today. He comes to believe it is at noon because he remembers an
appointment at noon written on a note on the kitchen table. The
note on the kitchen table was in fact a note stating that he had a
lunch appointment, the following day, at noon. Though his doctor’s
appointment really is at noon today.
In Case 4, knowledge isn’t present. After all, it’s just dumb luck that
the time of the doctor’s appointment was the same as the time of the other
appointment written on the note Otto** recalls having seen. Both Case 4 and
Case 2 can’t be intracranial analogue cases to Case 1. After all, knowledge
is present in Case 2 but not in Case 4. To emphasise, if Case 4, rather than
Case 2, is an intracranial analogue case to Case 1, then the tension with
E-parity is avoided. Consider, though, that Case 4 is of the same structural
type as Case 5, in that luck undermines knowledge in exactly the same way
in Case 4 as in Case 5:
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Case 5: Shep sees a sheep-shaped object in a field and comes to believe
there is a sheep in the field. Unfortunately, what Shep actually saw was
a sheep-shaped rock, which he mistook for a sheep. There was, however,
an actual sheep hiding behind the sheep-shaped rock, so Shep’s belief
is true32.
Recall again that veritic luck comes in two varieties, intervening and
environmental. That the kind of luck at play in Case 1 was akin to the
kind of luck at play in the barn facade case, which is purely environmental.
What explains why the agent could have easily gotten it wrong in cases of
environmental luck is just that the agent is in an epistemically inhospitable
environment. Nothing actually goes awry in the belief forming process, as it
does in cases of intervening epistemic luck.
Now Case 5 is a paradigmatic case where the kind of knowledge-undermining
epistemic luck is intervening (as was the case in Gettier’s (1963) original ex-
amples). Given that the structural similarity between Case 1 and the barn
facade (environmental luck) case is hard to deny, the prospects for present-
ing Case 4 (rather than Case 2) as a kind of intracranial analogue to Case
1 are not good. After all, Case 1 is a case where there was no intervening
epistemic luck, and this structural difference33 from Case 4 disqualifies it as
an intracranial analogue.
5 Concluding remarks
I’ve argued here that proponents of extended cognition should tolerate nei-
ther metaphysical nor epistemic bioprejudice, and further, that the stan-
dard line of thinking about environmental luck in mainstream epistemology
seems to betray bioprejudice of both sorts. More specifically, it looks like
32This is Pritchard’s pet example, which he uses in numerous papers to illustrate Gettier-
style (intervening) epistemic luck. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that
this case owes originally to Chisholm (1966/1977/1989), not Pritchard.
33This difference is especially important in Pritchard’s recent work, according to which
he (e.g. 2012) has argued that intervening epistemic luck, but not environmental epis-
temic luck, is incompatible with cognitive achievement, where cognitive achievement is
understand as a cognitive success that is primarily creditable to the exercise of an agent’s
cognitive ability. This point has important ramifications for proponents of robust virtue
epistemology (e.g. Greco (2010), Sosa (2007, 2009), who take knowledge to be, essentially,
a cognitive achievement.)
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the no-knowledge verdict in cases where an agent’s correctness is down to
environmental luck is at odds with both Clark & Chalmers’ original parity
principle (what I’ve called metaphysical parity) as well as with the E-parity
principle I’ve argued to be a natural extension of the parity principle in epis-
temology. This result is hard to accept, and in fact, I don’t think we should
accept it, at least, not just yet. Because cognitive extension is a relatively
new position in the philosophy of mind and the ramifications of this position
have not been comprehensively explored in epistemology, the conclusion that
either mainstream anti-luck epistemology or extended cognition is just plain
wrong, is premature.
I want to conclude by suggesting that the best way to avoid the impasse
might be for both anti-luck epistemology and extended cognition to do some
re-examining, specifically, of some of their commitments responsible for the
impasse I’ve sketched here. Though anti-luck epistemology seems to get the
right result across a spectrum of cases, we need a more precise account of
what to hold fixed under the description of the relevant way the belief was
formed in the actual world, when moving out to nearby worlds. Pritchard
(2007) himself has described the account on offer as vague on this point.
Anti-luck epistemologists need to do better, and when they do, perhaps this
will help deal with cases of extended cognition–cases for which the matter of
what precisely to hold fixed is of special importance.
What should proponents of cognitive extension re-examine? Chalmers, in
his foreword to Clark’s (2011) most recent monograph, Supersizing the Mind,
reflected on the impact of their co-authored paper which essentially created
extended cognition as a research area in 1998. Given the radical nature of the
extended mind view, there has unsurprisingly been a great deal of criticism34
over the past decade or so. As Chalmers sees it, much of the criticism can
be effectively dealt with. Chalmers still believes in the extended mind thesis,
however, he recognises that the position has a weak spot, which is its collision
with plausible insights about the dual boundaries of perception and action.
Here’s Chalmers:
It is natural to hold that perception is the interface where
the world affects the mind, and that action is the interface where
the mind affects the world. If so, it is tempting to hold that
what precedes perception and what follows action is not truly
34See, for instance, Adams & Aizawa (2001, 2008) and Rupert (2004, 2010).
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mental. And one might use this to draw a principled distinction
between the cases of Otto (the Alzheimer’s patient who uses a
notebook as memory) and Inga (the ordinary subject who uses
her brain). To interact with his notebook Otto must read it
and write in it, requiring perception and action, where there is
no such requirement for Inga. If so, then the boundaries above
would place the notebook outside the mind. (Chalmers 2011: xi).
The position that environmental luck can undermine the safety of a cog-
nitive success, and disqualify that success as knowledge, relies on some mean-
ingful distinction35 between the agent’s cognitive activity and the environ-
ment she finds herself in. When Otto writes in his notebook, he is at once en-
gaging in a cognitive process and, at the same time–through action–extending
himself into his environment. Proponents of extended cognition must find
a way of extending cognition into the environment while saving the differ-
ences36
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